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Flight and emigration often continue despite the formal termination of war 
and significant international peace-building efforts because the interna-
tional community often fails to address the root causes of flight and migra-
tion. Donors primarily aim at mitigating the direct consequences of war and 
pacifying elite groups rather than delivering peace dividends that benefit 
the broader population. 
 • The decision to flee during peacetime often closely relates to structural prob-
lems. Where peace is reduced to the mere absence of war and is of low quality, 
it is difficult to overcome major social cleavages. Thus the reasons for emigra-
tion persist.
 • Three factors shape the quality of peace across specific contexts: (i) the level 
of violence beyond the recurrence of war, (ii) the degree of access to justice 
and political participation beyond a formal change of the political regime, and 
(iii) the generation of social and economic prospects and social mobility.
 • Nepal and El Salvador are illustrative examples of the interplay of these factors 
at the interface between state and society. In these countries, state repression 
and other forms of violence persist, the political system is dominated by tradi-
tional elites or those that fought the war, and youths and former combatants 
lack prospects for the future.
Policy Implications
International actors need to adapt their strategies in post-war societies in a way 
that they support the broader population and not just the interests of the elite. 
While the termination of war and the introduction of democratisation might be 
first steps in this direction, they alone do not automatically lead to sustainable 
quality peace. 
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The 2015 European Migrant Crisis: New Levels of an  
Old Phenomenon
In 2015 the rising number of refugees arriving in the European union was  primarily 
driven by the Syrian civil war. Millions of Syrians escaped bashar al-Assad’s mili-
tary advances and clashes between the many non-state armed militias in the 
country. However, even in countries where civil war has (formally) ended, not all 
refugees return, and emigration does not come to a halt. Afghanistan, a so-called 
post-conflict society, is a case in point: despite the Taliban regime being removed 
in 2001 and internationally sponsored presidential elections being held in 2004, 
millions of Afghan migrants continue to settle in neighbouring countries or make 
their way to Europe – not least because Taliban attacks against civilians remain a 
significant threat. 
Afghanistan, however, is not an exception. There are numerous other coun-
tries that experience significant levels of emigration in the aftermath of civil war. 
In some states refugee levels have dropped following citizens’ return to their home 
countries, such as in Mozambique or Angola (see Figure 1). Many post-war societies, 
however, see their citizens leave in large numbers despite organised combat coming 
to an end and international and domestic reconstruction efforts beginning – some-
thing which has often perplexed Western politicians. commenting on the ongo-
ing arrival of Afghan migrants to Germany and the European union in 2015, the 
German federal minister of the interior, Thomas de Maizière, argued that because 
the international community had invested significant amounts of foreign aid in the 
country for post-war reconstruction and institutional reforms “The young genera-
tion and the middle class families ought to stay in their country and help build it” 
(28.10.2015). [1] But why do so many citizens in post-war societies continue to flee 
during peacetime?
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Figure 1.  
Variation in Post-War 
Refugee Flows 
Note: In the left panel 
the points represent the 
number of refugees in the 
first and fifth post-war 
years. Red lines indicate 
a decrease in the number 
of refugees and blue lines 
indicate an increase. The 
right panel illustrates the 
distribution of refugee 
counts for all countries 
in each year after con-
flict. Data points in the 
right panel are observed 
counts of refugees in a 
country-year.
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Emigration from Post-War Societies
The phenomenon of forced or voluntary outward migration is not new, but the num-
ber of people not living in their country of birth has reached a record high. In June 
2015 the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 
for the first time since World War II, more than 50 million people worldwide had 
been forcibly displaced, which accounts for roughly a quarter of the world’s total 
number of migrants residing outside their countries of birth. In fact, these numbers 
(and the figures we report in our cross-national comparisons and graphics below) 
are conservative estimates. The true number of refugees is masked by the uNHcr’s 
definition of “refugee,” which only pertains to those that officially seek political asy-
lum abroad. [2] People who leave their home countries without officially declaring 
themselves political refugees are not included in refugee statistics. but since they 
might nevertheless leave because of the reasons we list below, the true number of 
post-war emigrants is likely to exceed the figures reported by the UNHCR. 
The boundaries between voluntary economic migration and forced displace-
ment are blurred. Post-war states possess many of the push factors that are deemed 
to contribute to high levels of migration, such as weak national economies, politi-
cal instability, predatory and corrupt political elites, and widespread human rights 
abuses (Castles 2013). The motivation to emigrate is based on a mix of structural 
and individual factors. Three interlinked factors in particular determine why some 
post-war societies see large degrees of outward migration while others do not. Those 
factors are related to the quality of post-war peace, institutions, and livelihoods. 
Emigration and the Quality of Post-War Peace
An obvious explanation for varying levels of outward migration from post-war so-
cieties is that the quality of post-war peace differs between countries. For instance, 
people in states that continue to experience violence after war has ended – either 
in the form of direct attacks against themselves or potential violence against them-
selves (e.g. the looming threat of state-sponsored disappearances) – are more likely 
to leave the country in order to seek physical protection (Davenport, Moore, and 
Poe 2003).
crucially, post-war violence takes many forms, which are only indirectly linked 
to the battle-related violence that occurs during war itself. The violence  perpetrated 
in civil wars also varies, with instances of one-sided violence against civilians, 
sexual violence, torture, disappearances, private conflicts, violent crime, and re-
venge, inter alia, accompanying the direct confrontations between warring parties. 
In some cases, for example, underpaid state-sponsored militias have raped women 
and stolen cattle or other property as payment. ultimately, these manifestations of 
violence are not necessarily related to a civil war’s “master cleavage” (Kalyvas 2005) 
of controlling a government or territory, but are often closely interlinked without 
any clear-cut division. 
As a consequence, such acts of violence can persist even after war has formally 
ended with the signing of a peace accord. Even if full relapses into civil war do not 
occur, many post-war societies enter a grey zone of “neither peace nor war,” where 
violence remains a daily experience for the majority of the population. Similarly, 
2 In accordance with the 
1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, the UNHCR defines 
a “refugee” as a person 
who, “owing to a well-
founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular 
social group or political 
opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, 
and is unable to, or owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country”, see 
UNHCR:  
www.unhcr.org/pages/ 
49c3646c125.html  
(29 April 2016).
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although parties may not remobilise, some may use criminal activities to destabilise 
a newly elected post-war government (Westendorf 2015). Since people flee violence, 
and because different forms of violence often continue after civil war, people will 
try to seek physical security by leaving their respective countries and seeking refuge 
abroad (see Figure 2).
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the relationship between political terror and 
refugee levels. The upward slope of the regression line indicates that as the level of 
political terror increases, the number of refugees (plotted in a logarithmic scale on 
the y-axis) also grows. The right panel plots the intensity of non-state and one-sided 
violence against refugee levels. Even though the data is not as clear as that in the left 
panel, we can observe a higher number of refugees in post-war country-years with 
high levels of non-state and one-sided violence than in those countries with lower 
levels of civilian victimisation and fatalities from non-state conflicts.
Emigration and the Quality of Post-War Institutions
Another factor for why people continue to emigrate after war is the low quality of 
post-war institutions. The need for institutional reform (i.e. to reconstruct or to 
establish formal state institutions to manage conflict without the use of force) is a 
common feature in almost all post-war states. often, these reforms address the lack 
of inclusion in state institutions of groups that have long been marginalised and dis-
criminated against and aim to increase these groups’ political participation through 
implementing democratisation processes, power-sharing governments, or quota 
systems within civil administration. The underlying assumption is that reforming 
state institutions makes governance more inclusive and this, in turn, should have 
a pacifying effect. A second major field of reform in the aftermath of war is transi-
tional justice, which covers human rights violations. Such institutional reforms are 
often designed and implemented by a variety of international actors involved in the 
post-war reconstruction process, such as the uN and bilateral development assis-
tance organisations. However, the evidence shows that institutional reforms often 
do not work the way they are supposed to. This is because pre-war institutions do 
not just fade away but also influence the paths of reform. Moreover, international 
blueprints for institutional reforms are disconnected from local contexts and often 
fail to address relevant societal divisions (Ansorg and Kurtenbach 2016). 
Institutional reforms take time to be implemented and work as designed – as 
was the case with transitional justice. Perpetrators of gross human rights viola-
tions can only be prosecuted once they have lost their political and economic power. 
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Figure 2.  
Quality of Post-War 
Peace and Refugee 
Levels after Civil War
Note: Data points are 
country-years up to 10 
years after the end of 
the war. Data for the 
Political Terror Scale are 
taken from (Wood and 
Gibney 2015) and ranges 
from 1 (little political 
terror) to 5 (widespread 
political terror). Data 
for non-state and one-
sided violence are taken 
from Eck and Hultman 
(2007) and Sundberg, Eck, 
and Kreutz (2012), 49, 
2, 351–362. This article 
extends the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP and are summed 
per country-year).
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other institutional reforms need a long-term perspective and high levels of political 
commitment in order to be implemented in a non-superficial manner. The failure 
of important institutions like the judiciary or the state security sector may push 
emigration. First, without at least some minimal form of justice, perpetrators of 
war crimes often continue to execute strong influence in post-war societies, and vic-
tims are forced to live side-by-side with those that carried out gross human rights 
violations. Even if former warring parties do not remobilise in the post-interim pe-
riod, victims may emigrate due to fears of personal violence, reprisals, or revenge. 
Second, people might also have strong incentives to leave a post-war country (or 
remain abroad) if the judicial system does not provide the mechanisms required 
to manage conflicts according to existing rules, and if they are not guaranteed fair 
access to law institutions, equal treatment before the law, or secure property rights. 
Third, people will also be more inclined to emigrate or remain abroad if they are 
deprived of opportunities to participate politically. one of the main drivers of civil 
wars is the political marginalisation of certain social groups, which may continue 
even after conflict has ended. 
The data from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2015b) cross-nationally illustrate 
the second and third of these dynamics in Figure 3. The left panel plots the relation-
ship between V-Dem’s measure of equality before civil law [3] and post-war refugee 
levels in country-years after civil war. The relationship is weak, and the correlation 
is not statistically significant – though it is negative. [4] The relationship between 
participatory democracy and post-war refugee levels is somewhat clearer and statis-
tically significant: the higher countries score on V-Dem’s measure of participatory 
democracy (i.e. the higher citizens’ possibilities are to directly participate in politics 
through, for example, sub-nationally elected bodies or civil society organisations), 
the lower their refugee levels. 
Emigration and the Quality of Post-War Livelihoods
A final explanation for varying levels of outward migration from post-war societies 
is related to the quality of post-war livelihoods. The lack of social and economic 
opportunities is a key driver of both internal and outward migration, independent 
of whether a country has recently experienced violent civil war or not. but there is 
reason to believe that this mechanism is exacerbated in post-war environments. 
First, ex-combatants often enter the labour market following their participation in 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Thus, there is an 
even greater demand for jobs in war-devastated economies, which are characterised 
Figure 3.  
Quality of Post-War 
Institutions and Refu-
gee Levels
Note: In both panels 
the data points repre-
sent country-years of 
27 post-war countries 
with information taken 
from the V-Dem data 
project (Coppedge et al. 
2015b). The indicator 
in the left panel is the 
Equality before the Law 
and Individual Liberty 
index (v2xcl_rol) and 
the indicator in the right 
panel is the Participa-
tory Democracy index 
(v2x_partipdem).
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3 The measure quantifies 
expert codings of the fol-
lowing question: “To what 
extent are laws transparent 
and rigorously enforced 
and public administration 
impartial, and to what 
extent do citizens enjoy 
access to justice, secure 
property rights, freedom 
from forced labor, freedom 
of movement, physical in-
tegrity rights, and freedom 
of religion?” (Coppedge et 
al. 2015a: 266).
4 The negative pattern 
becomes more pro-
nounced once we subdivide 
the data into regions. In 
sub-Saharan Africa in par-
ticular we observe a strong 
and negative relationship 
between low equality 
before the law and high 
refugee levels
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by a distinct lack of employment opportunities. Given the pressure to find jobs in 
labour markets with very few possibilities, individuals develop strong incentives to 
leave their respective countries. Second, youth are at high risk of being drawn into 
violence or other “anti-social” behaviour in most post-war societies as access to 
economic resources is often controlled by generations that fought in wars and their 
respective clientele networks. Although youths are often better educated than their 
parents, decent work is largely unavailable in weak and unstable post-war states. In 
these contexts “emigration may work as a safety valve” (Urdal 2006: 624).
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between quality of post-war livelihoods and 
levels of post-war refugees. The left panel plots the relationship between GDP per 
capita and refugees in all post-war country-years. It shows that there is, in fact, a 
positive relationship between GDP per capita and levels of post-conflict refugees, 
albeit a very weak one. Even though this runs somewhat counter to the argument 
made above, it does make sense: individuals looking to leave their countries require 
a minimum amount of capital to pay for transportation and food, which means that 
emigration is only possible for those with access to this minimum amount of capital. 
In the right panel we plot the relationship between the extent to which a country 
provides private goods versus public goods. The idea behind this plot is that the 
preferential provision of many private goods (e.g. electricity, water, education, and 
health care) to small segments of populations causes people to leave their countries. 
This proposition is supported by our findings, which reveal that as the level of public 
goods provision increases, refugee levels drop. 
However, these general explanations and cross-national empirical trends vary 
in their concrete manifestations. The cases of Nepal and El Salvador illustrate the 
complex interactions between these individual explanations and put into context 
the cross-national trends identified in the previous section.
Nepal: Post-War Emigration as a Stabilising Factor
Nepal has seen a constant increase in forced migration since the end of the People’s 
War in 2006. According to uNHcr reports, there were 4,189 refugees from Nepal 
in 2007 and 8,109 in 2012; similar numbers appear for economic migrants, who 
provide roughly 30 per cent of the country’s GDP through remittances (Govern-
ment of Nepal 2014). During Nepal’s civil war, the Maoist rebel movement capital-
ised on the country’s increasing economic and political inequality and mobilised 
marginalised groups with promises of increased political representation and fairer 
Figure 4.  
The Quality of Post-
War Livelihoods and 
Refugees
Note: In both panels, 
data points represent 
country-years of 27 post-
war countries. The indi-
cator in the left panel is 
the “GDP / per capita” 
with data taken from the 
World Bank. The indica-
tor in the right panel is 
V-Dem’s “Provision of 
Particularistic or Private 
Goods” (v2dlencmps).
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land distribution. In 2006 the warring parties signed a peace agreement, which 
stipulated that elections would be held for the constituent Assembly. The Maoists 
won this vote, but polarisation in the constituent Assembly over the issue of fed-
eralism led to the body’s dissolution in 2012. The constitution was only promul-
gated in September 2015 after the urgency to begin reconstruction following the 
April 2015 earthquake had fastened a long-stalled constitution-making process. An 
analysis of the three factors outlined above reveals a specific mix. 
Although the Maoist rebels disarmed after 2006, physical insecurity and vio-
lence has been a common feature of Nepal’s post-war period. In 2007 non-state con-
flict between Maoist cadres and members of the Madhesi community in the Tarai 
plains resulted in over 30 deaths. The violence erupted once it became apparent 
that the post-war interim government would not fully address the demands of mar-
ginalised communities in the institutional reform process. The Tarai is also home to 
the latest episode of violence, where splits over the constitution has sparked clashes 
between Madhesis and security forces, killing at least 50 people as of April 2016.
A significant amount of post-war violence has occurred in the Tarai, and the 
majority of emigrants are men from low-income families in the Tarai (Government 
of Nepal 2014). However, there is no clear link between these two phenomena. In-
stead, this highlights a complex relationship between post-war violence and migra-
tion, which can only be fully understood by taking other “qualities” into account. 
In Nepal post-war violence is not an explanation for outward migration from the 
Tarai; rather, both migration and violence are consequences of larger underlying 
problems, such as a lack of institutional representation and limited economic op-
portunities for Tarai communities.
on paper Nepal’s institutional reform process is a success vis-à-vis other post-
war societies. For instance, it has seen relatively high levels of democratisation and 
a successful rebel-to-party transformation process. Nevertheless, the country’s in-
stitutional reforms were not without faults. First, a comprehensive transitional jus-
tice process had been lacking due to the disinterest of the parties. For instance, even 
though the peace agreement called for the creation of a truth and reconciliation 
commission in 2006, it was not implemented until 20140. Second, although Nepal’s 
institutional reform process successfully brought Maoist rebels into several power-
sharing governments, disadvantaged Tarai groups argue that they are becoming 
increasingly marginalised and that promised reforms have not materialised. 
As indicated, the failure of institutional reform to account for the grievances 
of the Tarai‘s Madhesi community in particular is one explanation for emigration 
from post-war Nepal. Early on in the peace process, refugees identified the lack of 
transitional justice mechanisms as a reason for why they were forced to flee. They 
also feared reprisals by cadres responsible for human rights violations during the 
war, who were still roaming freely in the post-war period. Post-war institutional 
reform accelerated the Madhesi’s and other groups’ grievances about political mar-
ginalisation. In 2007 and 2015 this lack of institutional representation resulted in 
violence – though such marginalisation is also a driver of emigration. Typically, 
“desirable jobs in the civil service, army, and judiciary” have been assumed by high-
caste  Hindu elites (caste and ethnicity are reliable proxies for access to wealth), 
which has led Tarai groups to often seek employment abroad (Clewett 2015). 
This discussion links to our final argument that Nepal’s peace process has thus 
far inadequately addressed the economic root causes of the war, which include 
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widespread poverty, landlessness, and economic inequality between castes and 
 ethnic groups. creating economic prospects in Nepal has been sidelined, and op-
portunities for the demobilised Maoist combatants who entered the job market in 
2013 are especially scarce. unsurprisingly, economic emigration has been an option 
for many ex-combatants – the majority of whom are today working on construction 
sites in Dubai or Qatar. One interviewed Nepalese civil society leader joked that the 
two employment opportunities for ex-combatants were either “militia or Malaysia.” 
The phenomenon of ex-combatant emigration is among the central reasons for why 
demobilised actors have not engaged in criminal activities or remobilised – that 
is, it has helped to reduce the risk of violence and insecurity. considered together 
with the fact that post-war violence and insecurity are drivers of emigration, ex-
combatant emigration from Nepal highlights the difficulties in establishing a clear 
link between the quality of post-war societies and migration. 
El Salvador: Emigration as a Safety Valve
Even more than 20 years after the war, over 20 per cent of the Salvadorian popula-
tion live outside of the country. According to uNHcr documents, there were 26,124 
refugees from El Salvador in 1992. However, while official refugee numbers have 
declined, the number of official migrants (the majority of whom live in the United 
States) has increased since the war. El Salvador has a tradition of migration, which 
was primarily on a seasonal basis and within the country or region. but the civil 
war (1980–1992) saw an increasing number of people leave the country. The money 
they send home has become an increasingly important source for the Salvadorian 
economy: remittances have climbed from 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 11.7 per 
cent in 1992 to 16.6 per cent in 2014 according to the World bank. [5] However, 
the continuous outward migration from El Salvador since the cessation of war is 
surprising given that the Salvadorian peace process is considered one of the few 
success stories of war-to-peace transition. After demobilising, the Frente Martí de 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) – the armed opposition – formed a political party 
under the same name and saw its candidates win the 2009 and 2013 presidential 
elections. Today, most of the Salvadorian population lives in communities with an 
FMlN mayor. Despite these positive steps in the post-war era, serious and long-
standing problems and cleavages remain.
During the early post-war period, the levels of violence decreased. Neverthe-
less, during the second half of the 1990s, the then right-wing government and the 
mass media started to sensationalise an increase in social and criminal violence. 
Although interpersonal violence was indeed increasing at the turn of the century, 
public debate exaggerated the extent to which that was happening and attributed 
it to poor young males (Oettler 2011). The government and media advocated zero-
tolerance policies, which reproduced traditional counter-insurgency policies, albeit 
in a post-war context. The result was a severe escalation of violence between gangs 
and state security forces. The close link between violence and emigration became 
evident when an unofficial truce between the two major street gangs and the gov-
ernment ended in 2015. Violence reached unprecedented levels and many people in 
El Salvador felt as if they had been transported back to wartime. A lack of physical 
integrity remains an important driver of emigration.
5 See the World Bank 
indicator: http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS 
(29 April 2016).
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The inability of the Salvadorian state and its institutions to reduce violence 
is closely related to post-war institutional reform. The chapultepec Peace Accords 
established a series of commitments to reform the country’s political institutions. 
For instance, the electoral system (which was established in the midst of war) was 
amended and allowed former guerrilla groups to participate. The security sector 
also underwent major reform, which saw the United Nations monitor the DDR pro-
cess and the uS government and European donors support the establishment of a 
new civilian police force composed of former military police, former rebels, and new 
recruits. While external observers saw a lot of potential in the new police force, the 
lack of political will among the traditional elites undermined the implementation of 
the related reforms early on. right-wing governments used these high levels of in-
security to block or even roll back security sector reforms. Public security was mili-
tarised, and the new division of labour between the civilian police and the army was 
blurred. As a consequence, repressive strategies were overwhelmingly employed to 
tackle crime and violence. The Salvadorian justice system is not any better.
FMlN presidents have by and large followed these public security policies. 
Despite claiming to prioritise violence prevention (as outlined in a 2012 violence 
prevention strategy), everyday practice still reflects repressive policies. This can be 
attributed to (i) the fact that the FMLN does not have a parliamentary majority and 
(ii) ongoing media campaigns that are nurturing a moral panic about gang violence. 
Although post-war emigration from El Salvador is a complex phenomenon, the in-
ability of dysfunctional central institutions to deal with violence without resorting 
to repression is at least an indirect factor.
A widespread lack of social and economic prospects for decent livelihoods is 
another factor behind emigration from El Salvador. The peace agreement did not 
change the economic development model. currently, over 50 per cent of the coun-
try’s economically active population earns less than the minimum wage; today, its 
purchasing power is only 30 per cent of what it was in 1970. The richest quintile 
of the population gets 50 to 60 per cent of the income, while the poorest quintile 
receives 3.5 per cent. At the same time, the Salvadorian tax ratio is only 13.6 per 
cent, which is low even compared to other latin American countries. [6] As a conse-
quence, any government looking to improve the situation faces serious difficulties 
due to a lack of resources. This social inequality is maintained by right-wing politi-
cians and the Salvadorian business elite, who control the media and the economy 
and are thus able to prevent any tax reforms or other initiatives that seek to bring 
about substantial change. In this context outward migration is a safety valve. re-
mittances from both legal and illegal migrants have become the most important 
source of external revenues, and the government has no interest in changing this.
To summarise, it is evident that post-war migration from El Salvador is heavily 
driven by the interaction of three factors: violence, dysfunctional institutions, and a 
lack of viable social and economic prospects. 
Peace Dividends for All
Peace is a complex phenomenon and consists of more than the absence of war. 
While the end of war might represent a window of opportunity, the establishment of 
inclusive post-war orders remains a long-term endeavour. The analysis of ongoing 
6 Data according to the 
World Bank: http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/
GCTAX.TOTL.GD.ZS,  
(7 March 2013.)
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emigration from post-war societies provides empirical evidence of the interplay be-
tween the necessity (i) to reduce violence beyond the mere termination of organised 
combat, (ii) to reform institutions, and (iii) to provide people with social and eco-
nomic prospects. International actors should thus include these measures in order 
to develop more holistic strategies for post-war societies. 
Nepal exemplifies the complexity of the interaction between the different drivers 
of emigration discussed above. There the eruptions of violence and the increasing 
levels of emigration that occurred after the war were both expressions of frustra-
tion with the lack of institutional representation and economic opportunities. The 
interplay between the three factors is also evident in El Salvador, where the lack of 
economic reforms is a key driver of non-state violence and state repression is used 
to maintain the status quo of inequality. Moreover, reforms of the country’s politi-
cal institutions have failed to provide security or increase participation among the 
socially excluded.
While post-war international strategies are getting ever more complex, they are 
still not comprehensive given their use of sequencing instead of holism. To reduce 
violence, international agencies and donors initially introduce projects that usually 
focus on DDR processes. Although these are important, they are not sufficient. Se-
curity is important not just for ex-combatants and elite groups but also for society 
as a whole. Hence, programmes for violence prevention and victim support should 
be implemented from the start and not just after post-war aid has been transformed 
into “normal” development aid. 
reforming institutions is a long-term and often contentious process. rarely do 
blueprints travel, and pre-war institutions do not vanish. Support for institutional 
reform has to be based on the knowledge of pre-war institutions and the main cleav-
ages in post-war societies. only then will institutional reforms cause less tensions 
and will the reformed institutions be able to displace violence as a means to solve 
conflicts.
last but not least, sustainable livelihoods – especially for young people – are 
a necessary condition for peace and for curtailing emigration. changing priorities 
from mere competitiveness to sustainable livelihoods, decent work, and better le-
gal regulation of migration might be the best instruments for creating sustainable 
peace and curbing outward migration.
If the international community pledges to combat the root causes of the current 
“refugee crisis,” it should be aware that war is rather a symptom of these root causes 
and that fundamental changes might be necessary to convince refugees to return.
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